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I.

Introduction
Improvements in the usage of formal financial services are widely recognized by policymakers and academics as supportive to development.
2 In addition to facilitating payments in a timely and efficient manner-a central component of modern societies, financial inclusion allows individuals and firms to move away from short-term decision making toward an inter-temporal allocation of resources. This encourages savings and removes the straitjacket of self-finance, thus improving incentives for productive investments (including investment in human capital through education). Moreover, when properly designed, financial services and products can help the poor to manage and insure themselves against a multiplicity of risks (ranging widely from health problems to natural disasters affecting crops, property or other sources of income and wealth). In a nutshell, financial inclusion can have substantial effects on welfare and can contribute to the reduction of poverty.
Not surprisingly, financial inclusion has become a key development focus for the G-20 summits since 2010 and efforts to improve financial inclusion around the world have been significant, including in Latin America. However, in spite of progress, the region lags behind significantly not only with respect to high-income countries, but also with respect to countries that can be called comparators, in the sense of having a similar degree of development as Latin America.
For example, based on World Bank data for 2014, the median value of financial inclusion in Latin America, measured as the percentage of the adult population that owns an account in a formal financial institution, was 40.8 percent. In contrast, the corresponding median for the region's comparators reached 60.3 percent and that for high-income countries was 97 percent.
The overall picture is more worrisome when looking at country-level data: only in three Latin
American countries (Brazil, Chile and Costa Rica) more than half of the adult population have account ownership and in some countries (Honduras, Peru and Nicaragua) less than one-third of the adult population is served. Data for usage of accounts for making payments, savings and borrowing also reveals substantial gaps between Latin American countries and their comparators. The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section II uses data from Global Findex database to characterize changes in financial inclusion in Latin America between 2011 and 2014. Based on alternative indicators of financial inclusion, the section addresses whether the region has improved financial inclusion gaps with respect to high income countries and Latin America's comparators. After identifying important obstacles to financial inclusion, Section III presents an econometric analysis in order to help explain Latin America's financial inclusion gaps; some important policy implications are derived from this analysis. Section IV acknowledges the evolving nature of the financial landscape in terms of providers and business models for serving the poor and identify new challenges that central banks might face for the implementation of 3 See http://www.worldbank.org/en/programs/globalfindex for a full description of this survey. In the 2014 Global Findex, the survey included about 150,000 adults in over 140 countries. Analysis of the survey results are in Demirguc-Kunt et al. (2015) . 4 Other databases used throughout the paper include the Financial Access Survey by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), which compiles country-level indicators of financial access and usage with annual data starting in 2004 (http://data.imf.org/?sk=E5DCAB7E-A5CA-4892-A6EA-598B5463A34C&ss=1412015057755) and the World Bank's Enterprise Surveys, which contain firm-level data that informs how access to credit affects enterprises of all sizes in emerging and developing countries (http://www.enterprisesurveys.org/). policies conducive to increase financial inclusion that do not conflict with their key mandate of preserving financial stability. Finally, Section V concludes the paper.
II. Latin America's Financial Inclusion: Where Does It Stand?
Based on the concept of usage of financial services to define financial inclusion, this section explores some characteristics of financial inclusion in Latin America across two dimensions:
cross-country and ( While Latin America's comparators are mostly emerging market countries, the category rest of the world includes the poorest countries in the world.
5 Data for variables reflecting the usage of insurance products are available in the Global Findex database for 2011 but not for 2014. Likewise, there is data on the usage of accounts through formal financial institutions for the purpose of making or receiving payments (such as using an account to receive wages or to send remittances) for 2014, but not for 2011.
To facilitate comparisons, a 45-degree line is included in the graphs. Countries placed to the left of the line are those whose value for the corresponding indicator has increased. Table 1 ). The increase in the median value for the savings variable was much less impressive though: only 4 percentage points (from 10 to 14.3 percent).
With respect to the borrowing variable, the increase in the median value for Latin America is even smaller: less than 3 percentage points (from 10 to 12.7 percent). Assessment of this variable, however, requires some special consideration. For any given year, the desirability of observing an increase in the percentage of adults who borrowed depends on country-specific economic conditions, quality of financial institutions and borrowers' characteristics. In contrast to payments and savings, it is important to rule out that the increase in borrowing does not reflect a case of households' over-indebtedness, even if starting from a very low base of debt. In this regard, it is not surprising to observe in Chart 1c that in some high income countries, the percentage of households that borrowed in 2011 is larger than in 2014: in some European countries, households were deleveraging after the financial crisis that started precisely in 2011. 6 While a full understanding of the significant increase in ownership of accounts at formal institutions requires further analysis on individual countries' peculiarities and policies, Demirguc-Kunt et al. (2015) suggest that the use of government transfer payments to increase financial inclusion may be one of the reasons, not only in Latin America, but in many other developing countries. They highlight the case of Brazil, where 88 percent of the population receiving transfers (15 percent of the adult population), receive these payments directly into an account. The authors, however, also indicate that only 12 percent of Brazilians receiving government transfers into an account withdraw the money over time; 88 percent withdraw all the money as soon as it is received. Another reason lies in the expansion of banks' infrastructure through branches and ATMs (more on this below). With respect to the increased usage in some The saving story is much less encouraging. The Global Findex savings indicator still places almost all Latin American countries among the economies whose adult populations save the least 6 Not surprisingly, Cyprus is the country placed closest to the lower right corner in Chart 1c. The significant slowdown in economic growth in 2014 relative to 2011 in a number of European countries also explain the lower percentage of adults in those countries who saved in 2014 (Ireland, Greece, Portugal and Cyprus are among the countries to the right of the 45 degrees line in Chart 1b). 7 For example, De Olloqui et al. (2015) argue that the banks' correspondent model in Latin America has had limited success in reaching the lowest income populations partly because of high costs involved in moving and protecting cash in remote and insecure areas. High levels of informality and a strong preference for undertaking cash transactions by low-income populations result in elevated ratios of cash-in/cash-out transactions which are very costly for financial institutions. Likewise, in an analysis on Brazil's banking correspondents, Sanford and Cojucaro (2013) concluded that while these agents networks have significantly facilitated person-to-person payments and bill payments, few users of these facilities have opened bank accounts or accessed credit through though the agent channel.
through financial institutions (Chart 1b To better assess diversity between countries, In order to complete the discussion before concluding this section, it is useful to provide some information on firms. Although, at the firm level, there is no information on financial inclusion Colombia stands out. Given economic instabilities in Argentina in the later period, it is not surprising that almost more than one-third of the enterprises in the country considered lack of access to finance as a major obstacle. Obstacles to the provision of financial services to large segments of the population are multidimensional and encompass factors affecting the demand for and supply of these services.
A large number of studies have shown that aggregate features at the country level as well as individual-level characteristics play major roles in explaining financial inclusion.
13 For example, Allen et al. (2012) show that in addition to country factors, individual characteristics such as age, sex, education level, income, employment and geographical location are significant determinants of populations' ownership and usage of accounts in the formal financial system.
In the case of Latin America, Rojas-Suárez and Amado (2014) conducted an empirical investigation that underlined the crucial role of the social, economic and institutional environment where the markets for financial services operate. 14 This section updates and builds on that research to present a discussion on four categories of obstacles for financial inclusion:
(a) socio-economic constraints that limit both the supply and the demand for financial services;
(b) vulnerabilities in the macroeconomic environment that deters large segments of the population from using the services provided by the formal financial system; (c) institutional weaknesses, with emphasis on the quality of governability of countries; and (d) characteristics of the formal financial system's operations that impede the adequate provision of financial services.
These operations respond both to the regulatory framework and to the specific features of the financial system (such as the competitive environment).
13 As reviewed in Rojas-Suárez (2007) and Allen (2012) . 14 Based on data from Global Findex 2011, Rojas-Suárez and Amado (2014) also analyzed the effects of individual characteristics on financial inclusion. Unfortunately, at the time of this writing, individual-level data was not available in the Global Findex 2014 database.
The section is divided in two parts: the first presents graphs and simple correlations between financial inclusion and alternative obstacles to get some insights on the behavior of these obstacles in Latin America relative to other country groupings. The second part presents an econometric analysis that serves to assess the relative importance of these alternative constraints in explaining Latin America's financial inclusion gaps.
In the main text of this section, the metric presented as a measure of a country's degree of financial inclusion is the percentage of adult population that owns an account in a formal financial institution, taken from Global Findex 2014. Annex II presents results based on the other two alternative metrics (savings and borrowings) discussed in Section I as well as an additional variable that measures usage of payments services: percentage of the adult population that have used an account to receive wages.
reducing inequality. 17 Thus, there is the possibility of reverse causality between these two variables.
18
Chart 3 presents the correlation between income inequality, as measured by the Gini coefficient and financial inclusion, measured by the percentage of the adult population with accounts in formal financial institutions. While the data for financial inclusion is for the year 2014, the data for the Gini coefficient is the latest available data from the World Income Inequality Database.
As shown in the chart, there is a significant negative correlation between these two variables (significant at the 1 percent level). 19 In this and the following charts in this section, countries are categorized as high-income (black dots), Latin American (dark diamonds), Latin American comparators (orange circles) and rest of the world (light-gray dots). 17 See, for example, Honohan (2007) . 18 However, as will be shown in the econometric investigation below, causality seems to run from income inequality to financial inclusion. 
Chart 3. Financial Inclusion and Income Inequality
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Macroeconomic stability can also have a significant influence on financial inclusion. Deep macroeconomic instabilities leading to financial crises drastically reduce the provision of credit and other financial services to small-and medium-sized firms as well as to non-wealthy individuals since banks attempt to restore their regulatory capital ratios by curtailing credit, especially to borrowers considered as riskier subjects of credit. The provision of payments services to low-income individuals and firms is also reduced to the extent that serving these populations involves higher costs than servicing wealthier groups.
On the demand side, macroeconomic stability plays a central role in determining people's willingness to entrust their funds to the formal financial sector. In many emerging markets, especially in Latin America, depositors have suffered large losses in the value of their wealth when following severe macro/financial problems, policymakers imposed policies that hurt depositors the most, such as deposit freeze, interest rate controls and/or forced conversion of deposits denominated in foreign currency (usually dollars) into local-currency denominated deposits at undervalued exchange rates. Moreover, memories of the losses in real terms suffered by depositors during periods of high and volatile inflation, and reflected in negative and volatile real interest rates, linger for a long period of time and are an important disincentive for savings through financial institutions. 20 The correlation between the Gini coefficient and the borrowing variable is negative, but not significant. When considering the variable on account ownership (Chart 4), among Latin American countries, the hyperinflation experienced during the early 1990s and macroeconomic difficulties in the 2000s place Argentina among those with high real interest rate volatility. Costa Rica is an interesting case. Several periods of high inflation and negative real interest rates were behind a high volatility of real interest rates. In this country, the high level of financial inclusion (relative to other Latin American countries) can certainly not be attributed to sustained macroeconomic stability; other country-specific factors lie behind these advances. On the other hand, Chile stands out for having a combination of low volatility of real interest rates and "relatively" high financial inclusion. As illustrated in Annex II.2, the negative correlation between financial inclusion and real interest rate volatility also holds when considering the payments, savings and borrowing variables, with the strongest correlation for the payments variable.
The quality of institutions, broadly defined as the set of rules and conventions that "constitute the framework for human interaction and determine the incentives for members of society" 21 has (2015) argue that in Latin America and the Caribbean, one of the most cited reasons for not having an account (after not having enough money) is that opening and maintaining accounts are too expensive. High costs for maintaining accounts or for applying for credit are directly related to the banking system's method of operation. The causes, however, are varied; they may reflect inefficiencies in banking operations, lack of competition or simply the high financial costs of providing services on a small scale. Distinguishing among causes is, of course, extremely difficult. However, to the extent that operational inefficiencies, reflected in high administrative costs and/or high concentration in the financial sector, are present, they could restrict the availability and increase the price of financial services to low-income populations.
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Chart 6 and Annex II.4 display the relationship between alternative variables of financial inclusion and the ratio of banks' overhead costs to total assets, a common indicator of banks' operational efficiency. To smooth annual fluctuations in this ratio, we considered the average covering the period 2006-2011. 26 For the variables reflecting account ownership, payments and 25 Of course, there are many other characteristics of the financial system landscape where financial institutions operate that are not conducive to improvements in financial inclusion, especially distortionary financial regulations that reduce financial institutions' incentives to deal with the poor; interest rate controls (caps on deposits and lending rates) as well as government-directed lending are two examples. Other features, such as sufficient economies of scale among scattered populations in distant locations, also constrain financial inclusion, but these features are mostly related to the socio-economic conditions of potential clients and individual-level, rather than country-level, analyses are needed to better understand their importance. 26 We'll try to update this number in the final version of the paper.
savings, the correlation equals -0.6 and is significant at the 1 percent level. The correlation for the borrowing variable equals -0.4 and is as significant as the rest of variables. While Chile displays ratios of overhead costs similar to those of high income countries, the median value of overhead costs as a percentage of assets reached 5.07 percent in Latin America-about 62 percent higher than the median value for comparators (3.14 percent).
What about high levels of concentration? The argument is that oligopolistic behavior could be detrimental for financial inclusion as there are incentives for banks to focus on the least risky clients who can afford the higher prices of financial services (above those resulting from a more competitive system) due to insufficient competition. The data, however, does not show a significant correlation between financial concentration and financial inclusion. Instead, consistent with recent literature, 28 the effects of high levels of concentration in the financial system on financial inclusion seem to depend on the quality of institutions. More precisely, the hypothesis is that bank concentration is negatively associated with financial inclusion mostly in countries with weak institutional quality. In those countries, lack of contract enforcement combines with oligopolistic power arising from high bank concentration to discriminate against low-income customers (individuals) or small borrowers (SMEs). This pervasive combination Chart 7 and Annex II.5 relate financial inclusion and a ratio of bank concentration; the latter is defined as the percentage of total system assets held by the three largest banks. Countries are divided into two groups: countries with high institutional quality, which are simply defined as those with a value of the variable weak law below the full sample average; and countries with low institutional quality where the value of weak law is above the full sample average.
Correlations are shown in Charts 7a and 7b respectively for the account ownership variable; and in Annex II.5a and II.5b respectively for the rest of financial inclusion variables. Honduras. The four countries have a similar degree of bank concentration, but the quality of institutions is much higher in the former set of countries than in the latter. This is consistent with much higher financial inclusion in terms of bank ownership, payments, savings and borrowing in Chile and Costa Rica.
The Relative Importance of Obstacles: An Econometric Analysis
The discussion above illustrated the association between a set of variables measuring the extent of populations' usage of financial services and obstacles for financial inclusion identified in the theoretical and empirical literature. This section builds on that discussion by presenting an econometric analysis to explain the determinants of financial inclusion. In this section, and for expositional purposes, financial inclusion is represented by the account ownership variable.
Following Rojas-Suárez and Amado (2014), the following equation is estimated:
Where 'i' denotes a country, _ is the percentage of the adult population that holds an account at a formal financial institution in 2014, is a vector representing the different obstacles to financial inclusion, _ is a dummy variable that indicates if the country is from Latin America, ℎ _ is a dummy variable that indicates if the country is neither from Latin America nor their comparators 29 and is assumed to be a disturbance with the usual properties of zero mean and constant variance.
The estimation of equation (1) updates the work in Rojas-Suárez and Amado (2014) by using data from Global Findex 2014 and updated values of the explanatory variables. A number of methodological issues are discussed in the former paper and need not to be repeated here.
The explanatory variables used in the estimation of equation (1) Weak Law represents the lack of enforcement of the rule of law, which was taken from the Worldwide Governance Indicators for the year 2014. The original variable, rule of law, was rescaled to a range from 0 to 100, and the variable Weak_Law is calculated by multiplying the rescaled variable by minus 1. This variable belongs to the category institutional factors.
Overhead_Costs is an indicator of banking operational inefficiencies, measured as the ratio of overhead costs to total assets. This variable was taken from the dataset created by Beck et al., and updated in November 2013. The original data is from the Fitch BankScope database. The variable in the regression corresponds to 2011 (the latest available data) and it is under the category of financial sector inefficiencies.
Bank_Concentration is measured as the share of the three largest banks' assets to all commercial banks' assets. This variable was taken from the dataset created by Beck et al. and updated in November 2013 . The original data is from the Fitch BankScope database. The variable in the regression corresponds to 2011 (latest available data) and belongs to the category of financial sector inefficiencies.
As discussed above, the literature suggests the potential presence of reverse causality between financial inclusion and income inequality. To tackle this possible endogeneity issue, we evaluate the convenience of using instrumental variables estimation (IV) to deal with this problem. 32 The endogeneity test is shown in Annex III. The main result is that it is possible to reject the endogeneity of Income_Inequality in the regression. This suggests that OLS is an appropriate estimator; a consistent and more efficient estimator than the IV estimator.
Table 3 presents the OLS estimation of equation (1). Starting with the Latin_America and
Other_countries dummies in the first column, each successive column in the table introduces one control variable at a time, with all the variables considered shown in column 7. This methodological presentation sheds light on the robustness of the variables included. In Table 3 , 31 In Rojas-Suárez and Amado (2014), the volatility of inflation, rather than the volatility of real interest rates was used. While this does not modify results in any significant way, we decided to change variables since, conceptually, real interest rates volatility is a better determinant of the usage of financial services. 32 A similar exercise was conducted in Rojas-Suárez and Amado (2014).
the order in which variables were introduced simply follows the order in which alternative obstacles were discussed in this paper. We conducted alternative exercises (not presented here)
to show whether the ordering mattered. It did not. For example, the variable Overhead_Costs had the right sign but was never significant; it did not matter whether this variable was introduced early on in the exercise or at the end (as in regression 7). Likewise, all other variables considered were always significant regardless of the ordering of variables. The goodness of fit of the regression including all controls (column 7) or the regression excluding the non-significant variable Overhead_Costs (column 6) is quite high: the adjusted Rsquared is above 0.7 in both cases. All the obstacles considered also had the expected negative sign: an increase in their values had an adverse effect on financial inclusion.
An important result from the analysis is that, with the exception of the regression in column 1, the coefficient for the Latin_America dummy in regressions 2 till 7 is not significant, implying that the controls included in the regressions are as good for explaining financial inclusion in Latin America as they are for any other country grouping. By construction, the value of the coefficient of the Latin America dummy in column 1 reflects the difference between the average financial inclusion in Latin America and its comparators (13.7 percentage points in absolute terms); that is, this value equals Latin America's financial inclusion gap relative to its comparators. 33 Using the estimated value of the coefficients from equation 7 and the average values of the variables considered for Latin America and its comparators, the predicted value of Latin America's financial inclusion gap equals 16.8 percentage points in absolute terms.
34
How important are the alternative explanatory variables considered in Table 3 to understand Latin America's financial inclusion gap relative to its comparators? Based on the estimated coefficients, Chart 8 presents the implied contribution of each non-idiosyncratic determinant of financial inclusion (that is, excluding the Latin_ America dummy) to explain the financial inclusion gap.
33 Notice that we are underscoring that here we are referring to the average gap for Latin America relative to its comparators. The value of the median gap for Latin America with respect to its comparators is presented in Table 1 (19.5). 34 The estimated gap is calculated using the following formula:
. The resulting gap is a negative number. In order to facilitate the exposition, the values are multiplied by -1.
Chart 8: Decomposition of Financial Inclusion Gap between Latin America and Its Comparators (percentage points)
Source: Own elaboration.
Income inequality (Gini) and institutional quality deficiencies (weak law) are the most important obstacles for explaining the gap. The effect of macroeconomic instability (through the volatility of interest rates) follows, but is much less important. The effect of the overhead cost ratio in explaining the gap is minimal.
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As discussed above, the role of the quality of institutions is dual: Low institutional quality has a direct adverse effect on financial inclusion, but it also has an indirect effect through its impact on the concentration of the banking system in affecting financial inclusion. These roles are clearly presented in the graph. First, through its direct effects, Weak_Law explained 7.3 percentage points of the predicted financial inclusion gap (in absolute values). Second, even though the variable Bank_Concentration reduced the gap (indicating that banking systems are more concentrated in comparator countries than in Latin America), the interaction between Weak_Law and Bank_Concentration significantly contributed to explain the financial inclusion gap (6.7 percentage points). That is, on their own, differences in bank concentration did not contribute to 35 Overhead cost is included in these calculation for completeness, but as mentioned before, the coefficient of this variable is not significant. The results from Table 3 can also be used to calculate the relative importance of alternative obstacles in explaining Latin America's financial inclusion gap with respect to high-income countries. In this case, the observed value of the average gap equaled 50.7 percentage points (in absolute value), while the predicted gap from the regression equaled 45.8 percentage points. The implied contributions of the non-idiosyncratic variables are shown in Chart 9.
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Chart 9: Decomposition of Financial Inclusion Gap between Latin America and High Income Countries (percentage points)
36 The estimated gap is calculated using the following formula:
. The resulting gap is a negative number. In order to facilitate the exposition, the values are multiplied by -1. The results are similar to those obtained for the Latin America's financial inclusion gap relative to its comparators, with the effects (direct and indirect) of institutional quality being even more dramatic. Indeed, differences in institutional quality tell most of the story, but income inequality is also important.
To recapitulate, the four categories of factors discussed above affect financial inclusion in Latin America. Albeit having different degrees of importance, they are all relevant for improving the usage of financial services. The analysis has been conducted at the regional level. Important differences between countries (reflected in the large difference between average and median values) suggest that further research is needed to identify country-specific importance of each type of obstacle and to guide policy recommendations. For example, high costs in the provision of financial services (reflected in overhead cost ratios) was not significant in the cross-country econometric analysis of Table 3 .
However, in many Latin American countries, it would be difficult to deny that advances in technology can help to leap-frog outdated payment systems and infrastructure for a more efficient delivery of these services.
IV. Looking Forward: The Evolving Landscape of Financial Inclusion and Key
Policy Issues for Central Banks
So far, the discussion has focused on financial inclusion solely involving banks and other traditional financial institutions. The reason is that in Latin America the dominant model for the provision of financial services is bank-led through the rapid expansion of branches, ATMs and banking correspondents. 37 However, experiences around the world show that improvements in financial inclusion involve the continuous entrance of new institutions and agents as providers of financial services. In addition, development of innovations and business models is on the rise.
More recently, the usage of digital means, especially for payments, but also for more complex forms of access and usage of financial services, has shown great potential in reaching large segments of the financially-excluded population.
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Chart 10 shows the large differences between Latin America and other country grouping regarding mechanisms for provision of financial services. Among emerging and developing economies, Latin America stands out for having achieved the highest ratio of branches plus ATMs per 100,000 adults relative to the region's comparators and to other developing countries.
This advantage has even increased from 2011 to 2013 (Chart 10a). However, with some notable exceptions, such as Brazil, Latin American banks' outreach through this type of infrastructure (plus their banking correspondent networks) does not map well with the still very low levels of financial inclusion in the region. 39 The region's comparators have lower ratios of outreach through branches and ATMs but higher ratios of financial inclusion. This suggests that to serve large segments of the population improvements in the effectiveness of existing infrastructure and 37 Although, as discussed in Section II, recent research shows important limitations in Latin American banks' infrastructure to reach the poorest segments of the population. 38 As the case of Kenya demonstrates, payments and transfers through mobile phones can serve to provide information about customers' characteristics and, therefore, increase their probability of becoming attractive subjects of credit. In Kenya, with the approval of the Central Bank and the Telcom authority, Safaricom, a mobile network operator (MNO), used its extensive mobile phones network to offer electronic payment and transfer services. The product, called M-Pesa, does not require individuals to have individual bank accounts; instead cash received by M-Pesa agents (to be converted into electronic money) is pooled and deposited as a single account in trust banks. The big success of M-Pesa led to the development of other financial products linked to M-Pesa account. For example, M-Shwari is an individual deposit in banks; and other credit and insurance products also linked to MPesa have developed. Thus, from simple payment services, M-Pesa has allowed for an increase in ownership of bank accounts and greater financial inclusion through the traditional financial system. 39 For example, Peru occupies the second place (after Colombia) in terms of number of branches per 100,000 adults. Peru, however, is among countries with the lowest ratios of adults who own bank accounts (with a ratio of 29 percent, Peru places in the second lowest position with respect to financial inclusion; Peru only ranks higher than Nicaragua, which has a ratio of 19 percent).
business models are needed and/or that alternative means of outreach need to complement existing ones. There are multiple paths towards improvements in digital financial inclusion and they are country specific. However, given different comparative advantages, it is likely that the future will involve a combination of new and traditional providers. For example, while Mobile Network
Operators and other Digital Service Providers (DSPs) have the low-cost technology for small transactions over distances, banks and others traditional providers have the institutional setup and processes to deliver a more complete menu of services for financial inclusion, including credit and insurance. There is no reason to believe that this will not be the case in Latin America, even though we might be talking about the distant future given the little progress achieved so far in most countries in the region in terms of provision of mobile money.
Against the background of new entities and new instruments entering the financial system for the purpose of improving financial inclusion, the rest of this section focuses on the issues that central banks are and will be facing in their roles of guarding the appropriate functioning and stability of the payments system and as overall regulators of the financial system. In what follows, this section presents concerns raised by central banks, discusses their relevance and suggests a regulatory framework that can help deal with these concerns. 
What Are the Concerns?
A common concern among central bankers is that the entrance of new players using technological innovations and new modalities to serve the financial needs of the poor could compromise the soundness of the overall financial system. In Latin America, this concern has often delayed or prevented approval of legislation for offering electronic money.
Generally speaking, central banks perceive three potential risks. The first risk relates to the potential decrease in effectiveness of monetary policy resulting from an expansion of means of payments outside the control of the central bank.
The second risk relates to the stability of the payments system resulting from eventually allowing non-bank digital payments providers, including MNOs, to access banks' retail payment systems.
The fear is that entrance of non-bank players might increase the overall risk of the system.
The third risk is that financial innovations for the provision of credit to low-income households and small firms might result in excessively risky credit growth and lead to high rates of default and, in part due to financial system interconnections, lead to system-wide risks. The mortgage crisis in the United States exacerbated this concern among regulators around the world, as there was a widespread perception that mortgage loans provided to low-income households played a central role in triggering the crisis.
However, increased financial inclusion, whether technology-driven or traditional, does not need to reduce the effectiveness of monetary policy or create systemic financial instabilities. 44 Instead, the opposite can hold, where financial inclusion supports the conduct of monetary policy and enhances overall financial stability. For example, as discussed above, the experience in Kenya demonstrated that as the offering of digital payments by non-traditional providers matured, new products involving bank deposits developed. As a result, the demand for cash declined and that for deposits increased, leading to higher financial intermediation and an improvement in the effectiveness of monetary policy.
With regards to the participation of non-banks in retail payment systems traditionally used by banks, changes in the regulatory framework need to accompany the evolution of innovations for financial inclusion. As will be discussed below in more detail, a key feature of an adequate regulatory framework is to regulate by functions and not by institutions. If non-bank digital service providers are to ever share the banks' retail payments system, the business line offering payment services needs to be established as a separate legal entity and needs to meet equivalent requirements to those satisfied by banks when accessing the payment systems.
Likewise, innovations for providing credit to low-income segments do not have to be destabilizing. In the U.S. mortgage crisis, the problem was not deficiencies in the underlying technology used to provide financial services to the financially-excluded, but abuses in loan origination, securitization, and distribution. Once again, to prevent these abuses the appropriate regulation, supervision and corporate governance practices have to be in place. Indeed, greater financial inclusion can improve rather than challenge financial stability. The reason is that increased financial inclusion can lead to a wider costumer base with more diversified risks, rather than the often much narrower and risky base of enterprises and connected lending typically found in many developing countries in general, and in Latin America in particular.
Three Pillars for an Appropriate Regulatory Framework that Supports Financial Inclusion
Recent analysis by a Global Task force at the Center for Global Development (CGD, 2016) has concluded that an appropriate regulatory framework that simultaneously meets the objective of financial stability, financial integrity and financial inclusion needs to rest on three pillars. These pillars are: (a) regulate by function, (b) follow a risk-based approach, and (iii) balance ex-ante and ex-post regulations. This paper endorses those recommendations.
Regulating by function implies that similar financial activities need to be subject to similar regulations regardless of the institution that conducts the activity. The fundamental reason is that advances in technology and the ongoing evolution of players and products in the provision of financial services is making increasingly difficult to map a type of provider with a type of financial service (think of the difficulty in defining "mobile money" and its distinction with "mobile banking"). Thus, regulating by function rather than by institutions seems appropriate, in general. Indeed, regulating by function levels the playing field for alternative providers of financial services. This supports competition, which in turn benefits financial inclusion. A caveat to the econometric results must be mentioned. The analysis was conducted at the regional level and due to restrictions on the sample size, no fixed effects to reflect individual country characteristics were included. Thus, to reach policy recommendations at the country level further research is needed. For example, high costs in the provision of financial services was not significant in the cross-country regressions. However, in many Latin American countries it would be difficult to deny that outdated payment systems and infrastructure, among other deficiencies, are important factors raising the costs of providing financial services.
Finally, the discussion in the paper recognized that the recent impetus for improving financial inclusion, while warranted, might bring new challenges to Latin America's central banks in their role as regulators of the financial system and guardians of financial stability. Looking forward, a particular concern is that the entrance of non-traditional players, such as mobile network operators, providing digital financial services to the poor could increase financial system risks. In 
Annex III: Endogeneity Test for Income Inequality
The Durbin-Wu-Hausman test is used to identify the potential endogeneity of Income_Inequality. To this end, and following Calderon and Chong (2001) , the following trade variables are used as instruments: (a) Trade_Openness: ratio of exports plus imports to GDP in 2013 from the World Bank database; and (b) the interaction between trade openness and trade concentration (Trade_Openness*Trade_Concentration): Trade_Concentration is a concentration index (HHI) of merchandise exports and imports for 2013, normalized to obtain values ranging from 0 to 1 (1 represents maximum concentration). The source of these data is the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). Calderon and Chong (2001) argue that although higher level of trade openness decrease income inequality, the effect is reduced at high levels of trade concentration.
The following 
Annex IV: The Marginal Effect of Bank Concentration on Financial Inclusion in Latin American Countries
Taking into account the importance of the interaction between bank concentration and institutional quality to explain financial inclusion, the relevant coefficients from the regression discussed in Table 3 can be used to estimate the marginal effect of bank concentration on financial inclusion. This effect has two components: (a) the linear, direct effect of bank concentration (equal to the estimated regression coefficient of the variable bank concentration) and (b) the non-linear effect derived from the impact of institutional quality (Weak_Law) on bank concentration in affecting financial inclusion (equal to the value of the estimated parameter of the interaction, Bank_Concentration*Weak_Law, multiplied by the 2014 value of the variable Weak_Law.
Such a computation generates the straight line depicted in the chart below. Clearly, the marginal effect of bank concentration varies for every possible value of the variable Weak_Law. As shown in the Chart, the lower the quality of institutions (the higher the value of the Weak_Law variable), the larger the negative total effect of bank concentration on financial inclusion. The chart also shows that there is a range where institutional quality is high enough that increases in bank concentration do not have an adverse effect on financial inclusion (the most advanced economies are in that range).
Marginal Effect of Bank Concentration on Financial Inclusion
Source: Own calculations based on regression 7 of Table 3 in the main text and Worldwide Governance Indicators (2014).
For 2015 values of the variable Weak_Law, Chile is the only country that passes the threshold. In Chile the quality of institutions is high enough to more than offset the negative impact of bank concentration on financial inclusion. In the rest of Latin American countries, an increase in bank concentration affects financial inclusion negatively. 
